"UK to be Superpower" & other Starmerite nonsense

Those few very-longtime readers we still attract, might recall I spent a while on business in The Gambia a decade ago, and very educational it was, too.  One of the things I learned was that by the time of roundabout now (i.e. 2025) The Gambia would have become an *Economic Superpower*.  Sic!  You can read about it here, in this rambling presidential state-of-the-nation address of the time from His Excellency Sheikh Professor Alhaji Dr Yahya Jammeh Babili Mansa. 

And what a state the nation was in!  (E.g. no 'phones in my "4-star" Sheraton, no reliable electricity, etc etc.)  But I think his noble mission has failed.  He's no longer around to carry the can, however: he was deposed shortly afterwards in an unusually peaceful coup.

Which brings us to Starmer, Reeves, Miliband, and their curious brand of self-aggrandizing nonsense.  First, you recall, we are to become a "Clean Energy Superpower" - by 2030, I believe.  That's without having a manufacturing base for solar panels, wind turbines, even steel these days (can we still manage concrete?), nor a workforce of adequate skills or size.  Perhaps "clean-energy-equipment importing superpower"?  But it doesn't have quite the same grandiose ring, does it?  Everyone in the government photo (from the link above) seems to think it's pretty funny, and I'm sure we all get the joke.

What, and defence too?  Minister, stop, I'll wet myself!!  

Anyhow, not satisfied with this newly-minted aspirational status, we are also now to become a "Defence Industrial Superpower"!  And that, too, without, errr, a manufacturing base for chips, steel, ... etc etc. 

Amazing stuff.  I am sure the rest of the world's minor powers are shaking in their boots.  With laughter.  Meanwhile, our bold triumvirate of superpower-mongers might care to study the fate of his Gambian Excellency.  

ND

Business Blunderers #1 - cont: it gets funnier

Continuing the story of Sir Archibald Forster's Big Business Blunders ...

For a period in the 1980s, the old monopoly British Gas had been paying ever higher prices for new long-term purchase contracts from North Sea gas producers: it was a sellers' market.  This came about from an archetypal monopoly planning cock-up: they'd contracted vast quantities of gas in long-term contracts during the huge boom of the late 1960's, priced in single-digit pennies per therm.  Being thus sated, they'd bought very little in the 1970s.  One day, they re-did the supply/demand sums and noticed - guess what? - a looming shortage!  Owing to the low gas price and, at the same time, booming oil prices after the twin crises of 1973-4 and 1979, everybody was exploring only those hydrocarbon plays that looked set to yield oil.  And new gas developments take several years to bring on stream.  

So, being a monopoly and not caring what things cost (they know who's gonna foot the bill, haha!), BG did the rounds, telling everyone that they'd be willing to pay more than 20 p/th - a gigantic price increase - for any new gas supplies that anyone could develop.  (The output of an entire field would be sold under a single contract for decades of delivery, years in advance.)  This sent every NS producer back into the vaults where they stored their old drilling logs, looking for long-forgotten gas discoveries they’d ignored as being totally uneconomic at those 1960’s prices.  Sure enough, new gas fields began to be offered and, true to its word, BG started a price-ramp of several years for new gas that by the mid 1980s saw prices in the high 20s of p/th.  A classic sellers' market phase in the great commodities cycle. 

Though no gas expert, Archie, headstrong Esso Chairman & CEO, somehow got it into his head there was no end to this ramp.  Esso had enjoyed a couple of big sales at stonking prices in this period, and one of his JVs now had a couple more new gas fields to offer BG.  Forster decided that he would triumphantly be the first to breach 30 p/th.  He convinced the JV partners to go along with an eye-watering opening offer of 34p.  Many of us were unconvinced, but were willing to go along for the ride.   Unfortunately, thus emboldened, Forster flamboyantly guaranteed to his Exxon overlords that a price in the 30s would in due course be delivered.  Sadly, he’d failed to notice the laws of supply and demand grinding slowly into action.  High prices bring forth, errr, lots of supply; and he’d not heeded warnings that a glut was coming inexorably down the production-line.  

When his hapless negotiators rocked up at BG, in response they got given a long and detailed list of new fields currently on offer.  BG stated it would only need to buy a couple of these, and told them to go away and recalibrate their aspirations to less than half of what they’d walked in the door with.  Yep, we were now in a buyer's market.

Cue carnage at Esso: was this right?  Why didn’t "we" see this coming?  Etc etc - the usual search for scapegoats.  It would have been fun to be a fly on the wall when Archie broke the fell news to his US masters; but BG was right: it was indeed sitting on a glut, as a bit of belated due diligence readily confirmed.  For its new gas fields Esso subsequently settled for 16 p/th**.  A salutary tale indeed. 

So many life-lessons - as my 11-year old granddaughter would say.

ND

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**  There's another lesson here.  In order to "justify" asking for 34p/th, the negotiators had been primed to say that detailed engineering confirmed this was nothing more than was needed, based on the ever-rising cost of offshore development.  Gosh, yes.  The JV had indeed concluded internally that a price in the high '20s was needed, even if 34 was taking the piss.  So: how come we didn't pack our bags and just go home, sadder and wiser, and leave the stuff in the ground?  

Answer: huge engineering projects build up serious momentum (see HS2, Sizewell C etc etc).  Big project teams had already been assembled: plum jobs awarded: a great deal of engineering work already done: we were not about to walk away from these sunk costs.  The teams were told to take out their sharpest pencils and bring the costs down - massively.  And lo - they succeeded!   As I've found many, many times in business life, engineers, like so many of the rest of us, are basically lazy and complacent; and if they think money is no object, they pile it on.  ("Safety" is the usual reason given for gold-plating - and who dares to second-guess them on that?)  But if they are told their jobs depend on it, suddenly they are capable of amazing innovation and rationalisation!  It is ever thus.  Only a good kicking does the job.

Miliband's perfect positioning

By way of elaboration on my assertion last week that Miliband can't remotely be discounted should Starmer topple in the near future, look at this telling chart from the loyalist LabourList platform and its Survation polling:

Survation / LabourList:     click link above for full-size

Every Cabinet member has seen their ratings fall after Reeve's efforts of last week: but L'il Ed's fell the least by far; and with Rayner heading west with all the rest, he's now miles out in front with Labour supporters.

He'll be making very careful decisions in the event his damn-fool energy policy dreams come under even more pressure from Reeves and her Growth-At-Any-Cost strategies.  Would yet another serious slap in the face be the ideal time to quit?  Or exactly the moment not to rise to the bait, and to hang on grimly instead, making the usual offstage noises and pointed absences that ensure everyone knows his true feelings?  The almost-iron rule of UK leadership elections is that Leaders of the two main parties only ever come from the ranks of the Cabinet / Shadow Cab.  And whilst in government, when the Chosen One becomes PM immediately?  That really is an iron rule.**

ND

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** The Corbyn Exception relates, of course, to a period of opposition - and even that needs qualifying for special circumstances, because there was only a 'shadow-shadow' cabinet in being during the short inter regnum of Harriet Harman, following the resignation of, errrr, one Ed Miliband.

Trump's Tariffs: the uselessness of economists

I heard a nice joke the other day:  

After astrology, came astronomy.  After alchemy, came chemistry.  And after economics ..? 

The world has been watching and waiting in a state of fear and loathing for Trump's long-awaited, bizarrely-telegraphed barrage of punches.  What will happen now?

To me, the hilarious aspect is that nobody has a clue.  I suppose everyone agrees it will act as a brake on world trade.  Well, duh.   OK, and ... ?

If macro-economics means anything whatsoever by way of a 'science', there should be a definitive answer when such extreme measures are taken.  And to me, an avowed econo-skeptic, this all looks to be as significant as, say, the oil-price hike of 1973-4. 

Anyone round here got anything better?  What we're after is solid, unequivocal, drop-dead economy-related predictions beyond the short-term and the trivial.

ND

Business Blunderers I Have Known (1)

Continuing from Jailbirds and Rogues ...

Archie Forster (Sir Archibald, 1928-2001) was Chairman / CEO etc of Esso = Exxon-in-the-UK.  I met him occasionally, he being the top Esso participant in a joint venture I was involved with.  He was a cheerful, bustling cove, but his business history told clearly of a dynamic and steely character, with much conventional success along the way (within the one-company career - and Exxon is an odd company). 

Once he got to the top, however, there were reasons to doubt his judgement and what must have been a heads-down, over-confident, solo decision making style ...  

The first story revolves around his determination to cash in the very valuable SW1 HQ property Esso occupied for many years - 1,200 people, multi-storey carpark, occupying more than an entire block on Victoria Street - and move somewhere cheaper.  Esso's geography dictated somewhere west and possibly south of London: its worldscale refinery is at Fawley, near Southampton;  it had a smaller refinery at Milford Haven; a research centre at Abingdon; and, not coincidentally, Forster lived in Winchester.  When we met Esso folks, they'd give us the latest office relocation update like Father Ted used to update Dougal on tales from the confessional: although it was meant to be secret, all the Esso guys had their contacts in the company treasury who would tell them the addresses of where they were sending the latest batch of cheques made payable to estate agents.  And so we learned of the search progressing along the M4 corridor, right out to Swindon - but seemingly there was something wrong with all of the sites they were offered.

Suddenly, a breakthrough!   A big, cheap, brownfield site (the old Goblin Teasmade factory) became available near Leatherhead, right on the M25, on the London side of the motorway.  Forster was delighted.  Excellent transport links; south-westerly from London; and, he had heard from somewhere, if the move was within the M25 - and it was, just - no redundancy would need to be paid to staff that didn't want to leave SW1.  Shedding staff without cost was part of the cunning plan.

Boy, was he wrong.  (a) The 16 miles between SW1 and Goblin is far further than a move which is of such short distance, it lets you off making redundancy payments.  Oh, and (b) although smack on the M25, it was not on a junction, and the nearest one is an absolute pig at rush hour.  Loads of staff considered Leatherhead / M25 a much different proposition to the comfortable public-transport journey to Victoria SW1, and took the money.  Being an upfront cost, the fat redundancy bill significantly impaired the deemed economic benefits of the relocation exercise, even if losing staff was part of the plan.  But he ploughed on anyway.

Embarrassing enough for his dealings with his masters in Florham Park NJ: but the second tale is, if anything, even funnier worse ...  to be continued.

ND